Abstract
Following Calavita and Krumholz's answers to conservative attacks on planning, this commentary offers another way to promote planning in public discourse. Transaction cost theory (TCT) debunks the "planning versus markets" dichotomy, relieving planning advocates from claiming the need for public intervention, an argument that encounters frequent skepticism. TCT makes the case for planning in three ways: (1) rejecting generalizations, it focuses debate on specific cases; (2) breaking the link between planning and government, it disarms conservative critics; (3) it provides an authoritative theoretical base for answering neoliberal attacks on public planning. Convincing people that planning (not only as public intervention) is necessary and enhances their welfare is an argument that can be won.
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"stake out [their] side clearly in [this] controversy" (p. 404) that pits planning, identified with public action, against a consumer-and business-friendly regime its proponents call "the free market."
But there is another way to make the case for planning, which can be at least as effective, and that is by avoiding this "controversy" altogether. I add the quotation marks designedly, because it is a fake controversy that is premised on a false dichotomy between "planning" and "the free market" (Alexander 2001b). The object of conservative attacks on planning is public or state intervention in market interactions and private decisions.
When planning is "defined broadly as government intervention" (Sanyal 2002, 327) , we invite these critics to make planning their target. In terms of our basic problem, the decline of planning in public esteem, this definition of planning forces us into a needless and perhaps fruitless defense of public intervention. But the association between planning and public intervention is not only counterproductive, it is wrong.
᭤ The Transaction Cost Theory of Planning
Associating planning with the state, and the juxtaposition of planning against the market, are long-standing prejudices both among planners and planning's enemies. Conventional explanations of planning in welfare economic terms (Moore 1978; Klosterman 1985) explicitly or implicitly associate planning with government intervention and state action, juxtaposing the (planning and planned) public sector with the "free" market. Other discussions of planning and markets reveal the same dichotomy, contrasting "market-" and "plan-rationality" (Dahrendorff 1968) , comparing "synoptic planning" to an incremental political market (Wildavsky 1979) , or identifying planning with the public domain (Friedmann 1987, 38) . But more advanced theory and observation suggest that this dichotomy is no longer correct, and if it ever was, it has outlived its usefulness. Many definitions of planning (e.g., as rational choice, as anticipatory coordination, or as the attempt to control future actions) are so general as to transcend it. Increasing complexity has also blurred the boundary between the public sector and the market.
Partial privatization and "third party governance" (Palumbo 1987, 97-99) have diluted the public sector, which is not the exclusive domain of sovereign state bureaus. The private market, too, is rarely the perfect market that classic economists love but has evolved into a variety of "hybrid" market forms. These include large, integrated corporations with many of the attributes of bureaucracies and link private firms with quasi-public and state agencies in various forms of marketmodifying governance (Williamson 1975) .
Planning is not limited to government agencies. In civil society, the gray area between the market and the state, planning is practiced too: in community organizations such as community development corporations (Vidal 1997) and in special interest associations, for example, environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club and the Nature Conservancy (Jamison 2001) . In the market, firms and corporations plan their own activities, formally applied in corporate strategic planning (Lorange 1982) . 4 Private planning offices also do most of the planning done today. They often provide governments' comprehensive forward land-use and development plans that back up their statutory planning and development control. Almost all sectoral planning, for example, for infrastructure and strategic facilities, land development and improvement, industrial production, and telecommunications, is done by expert consultant firms or by planners as in-house staff of sectoral firms and corporations.
Planning, then, is not only a property of the public sector. An adequate theory must transcend welfare economic rationales for planning, to account for planning in a way that can explain planning in the market itself and not only as something external or complementary to markets. The "Transaction Cost Theory of Planning" (Alexander 1992) does this. Integrated transaction cost theory (TCT) 5 shows that planning is associated with organization (that exists in the private and public sectors alike), breaking the link between planning and government.
᭤ Arguing the Case for Planning
I am more pessimistic than Sanyal is, or Calavita and Krumholz seem to be, about justifying public intervention as the way to restore the status of planning in "the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens" in the United States today. Intellectually, it is much harder than it was for the "normative argument for government intervention in the economy and society" to make a plausible case.
This does not mean that I propose conceding the ideological field to conservative proponents of minimal government. By all means, progressive advocates of public intervention should continue to fight the good fight for public planning (based primarily on social justice and the equity case for state action), oppose regressive taxation, and resist the gutting of beneficial public programs such as Medicaid and Social Security. It does mean that I believe, pragmatically (with Teitz Capturing the Public Interest ᭣ 103
[2000] as quoted above) that in the United States today, fundamental debate on these ideological lines is less conducive to the successful promotion of planning that we want. Even its most fervent advocates do not argue that any time, everywhere, more government is good for you. The "reinvigorated liberalism" that Sanyal advocates, and which Calavita and Krumholtz exemplify, founded on a strong commitment to social progress, is quite compatible with the TCT-based case for planning. Just as Sanyal (2002, 305) proposes, TCT highlights the complementarity between government, civil society, and the market under the overarching concept of governance. 6 In public discourse in the United States today, TCT can provide a more convincing foundation for planning's claims for societal status and respect than arguments based on the respective merits of "planning" and "the market." Advocacy for planning linked to (even a reconstructed) "normative argument for government intervention in the economy and society" is likely to encounter well-founded skepticism. Calavita and Krumholz's successes confirm rather than refute this generalization: rather than a generalized "reinvigorated liberalism," their op-ed pieces argue the effectiveness of planning in terms of very specific issues, programs, and contexts. That is exactly what the TCT-based approach proposes to do.
There are several ways in which TCT helps to make the case for planning and repel its critics' attacks. The first and most important is the retreat TCT demands from universal generalizations. In forcing both "reinvigorated liberals" and conservative economists to abandon their respective categorical advocacy of public planning or "the market," it focuses the debate on context-and situation-specific institutional analysis and design.
At the same time, it offers a broader repertoire of various kinds of planning for discussion, not just planning as public intervention. These include voluntary community planning (e.g., community development corporations) and planning in civil society (special interest organizations), planning in markets (corporate strategic planning; private firms' sectoral planning, e.g., strategic infrastructure and facilities, planned developments, and new communities), planning of markets (devising and implementing market-like allocation frameworks such as transferable development rights and tradable emission points) and planning for markets (e.g., public landuse planning for efficient land and property markets).
The second way is in breaking the link between planning and government and substituting the association between planning and organization. Except perhaps to anarchists, organization is value-neutral, without the ideological connotations of government that make public planning the object of attack. Making planning intrinsically value-free neutralizes all its ideological critics. In this way, TCT disarms neoclassical economists' critiques of planning as public intervention, property rights advocates' assaults on land-use planning as unwarranted regulation, conservatives' identification of planning with an overblown welfare state, and privatization supporters' opposition to planning associated with public ownership.
Of course, divorcing planning from public intervention removes its ideological content.
7
This does not mean that all planning has to be ideologically neutral, only that their ideologies qualify specific types of planning. Thus, radical planning focuses on specific values, and economic development planning may emphasize others.
A value-neutral generic planning does not preclude a normative philosophy for (say) public planning, or a progressive agenda for planning education, but it must be explicit (Alexander 2000, 14) . Contrary to Markusen (2000) , it is not planners' adoption of a prescribed philosophy that makes them planners, but it may make them better planners. Nor does redefining planning make it immune to attack. But it forces critics to articulate their terms and focuses debate on the particular form of planning under discussion.
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TCT also offers a third way to argue for planning. Besides deflecting attacks on planning that are really critiques of public intervention, TCT provides an authoritative theoretical base 9 and a set of conceptual tools for responding to attacks on public planning itself. It does this by moving the debate from the arena of broad generalizations to the locus of situational specifics.
Neoclassical economists' attacks on public planning (Markusen 2000, 265-69) are the easiest to refute. TCT rebuts their unqualified advocacy of privatization; instead, it demands close institutional analysis of the specific case to determine the most appropriate form of governance. Such analysis can conclude that the public bureau is the most effective for a particular purpose, as Williamson (1999) did for the U.S. State Department, or that public planning and regulation may often be the best way of ensuring an efficient market, as Alexander (2001a) did for land-use planning and development control.
TCT also demands abandoning neoclassical economics' narrow focus on the goal of economic efficiency. It recognizes a broader goal of effectiveness in its criterion of minimizing parties' and stakeholders' transaction costs.
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In institutional analysis to review alternative modes of governance, this can replace the simplistic Pareto optimization on which neoclassical economists base their opposition to public investments and their case for privatization and deregulation.
In a more parsimonious argument than welfare economics, TCT shows that the neoclassical economists' perfect market is a myth. Public intervention (which can take various forms)
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Alexander may be needed not only to address market failure but to make efficient markets possible at all. TCT also answers public choice theorists' advocacy of deregulation and privatization based on their diagnosis of government failure. It does this by rejecting general propositions and applying contingent analysis to suggest that public intervention may be appropriate where market failures exist, while markets or administered market-like governance are called for where government failure is likely. A reasoned counterattack on property rights advocates' assault on public planning and regulation can make its case without invoking any softheaded notions of equity, sustainability, social justice, public interest, or the like. TCT proves that landowners' property rights are not a gift from God but a form of social contract necessary for markets to exist at all. Efficient operation of the market, in which, after all, they have a common interest, demands some form of forward planning, land-use allocation, and development control; these can take a variety of forms that include public planning and regulation (Webster and Lai 2003) .
Conservatives' attempts to privatize the public welfare state and, with it, to de-legitimize public planning, are also vulnerable to counterarguments drawing on their own economic theoretical base. TCT denies the unqualified primacy of "the market" as the default option for delivering public programs or services. Rather than blind privatization, needed institutional change should be preceded by detailed analysis and a review of alternative feasible forms of governance.
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In retrospect, timely institutional analysis might have avoided the privatization of prisons, which some recent evaluations suggest was misguided, and may not be too late to apply to issues such as human services delivery and poverty reduction, education, and economic development such as defense plant conversion. This is the language in which we planners should engage in public debate. In this day and age, the attempt to reverse public planning's declining esteem by offering a "reconstituted liberalism" as a warrant for government intervention may be doomed to failure. Convincing people that planning-not only planning as public intervention-is necessary and contributes to their welfare, and disarming the critics of planning, is one argument we can win. Defining the role of public planning, and justifying public intervention as an appropriate form of governance in well-defined cases and contexts, is another.
᭤ Notes
1. These call for other approaches than the subject of this commentary, to promote planning and enhance the quality of planning education, research, and practice.
2. Organizations include firms, networks, and governments (see also below); here planning is distinguished from "spontaneous," ad-hoc and decentralized decision making by individuals or atomized social units, supposedly characterizing economic and political markets (Webster and Lai 2003, 12-13) .
3. A recent manifestation is the (electronic) journal Planning and Markets (edited by planning academics at the University of Southern California), which is "devoted to the study of planned interventions versus market approaches." 4. Indeed, in one view the firm exists to plan: the critical incentive for the evolution of firms is the need to respond efficiently to the market's signals, requiring "decision making [that is] coordinated ex-ante in firms" (Hermalin 1999, 104) , and ex-ante coordination is planning (March and Simon 1958, 158-69) .
5. Integrated transaction cost theory (TCT) extends economic TCT from the economic market into the public institutional domain. Economic TCT is a branch of institutional economics; for a very summary account of TCT and its sources, see Alexander (1992 Alexander ( , 2001a .
6. This approach, rather than the traditional view of planning as a state function, also pervades recent discussions of planning; see, for example, Healey (1998); Gualini (2001) .
7. This includes the positive values which some of its advocates would give it (Friedmann 1987, 340-42, 389-412; Markusen 2000, 264-65) and the negative attributes its radical critics associate with planning (Yiftachel 1998) .
8. Just as neoliberal conservatives attack planning as government intervention, neo-Marxist and radical critiques of planning are really aimed at one form of planning: "a specifically spatial practice . . . related to the state and the production of space" (Huxley and Yiftachel 2000) . Criticism (from opposing ideological perspectives) of state land-use planning, allocation, and regulation, is valid and constructive, providing the subject is defined and debate is framed as an evaluation of feasible alternatives; for example, for a repertoire and analysis of alternative forms of land-use planning and development control, see Alexander (2001a).
9. Authoritative here is not meant in any absolute sense but in the context of the debate on public planning; here TCT is authoritative (in a way that, for example, Habermasian critical theory is not) because it has common disciplinary-theoretical foundations (in economics) with the intellectual base (neoclassical economics) of the critiques themselves.
10. Depending on how relevant actors and stakeholders are identified (e.g., including a broad range of stakeholders and affected publics), and what are defined as transaction costs (e.g., the various costs, in terms of decision delays, organization, and litigation) of confrontational conflict, this criterion can integrate efficiency with equity considerations.
11. See, for example, Sclar (2000) .
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